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Through military lenses. 
Perception of security threats and jointness in the Italian Air Force 
Abstract. The article explores Italian Air Force (ITAF) officers’ perceptions of 
military transformation and of changes in the global security environment. 
While several studies have addressed the challenges faced by European armed 
forces in the last two decades, the methods used have been rather uniform, 
mostly relying on in-depth case studies through qualitative interviews and 
analysis of strategic documents and budgets. Using data from an original, and 
unique, survey conducted among ITAF captains (N=286), this article focuses on 
servicemen’s attitudes towards the transformations of the global security 
environment and the changes occurring (and needed) within the Italian Air 
Force. After describing the “military view” on these topics, the article provides 
preliminary statistical evidence on the links between individual experiences, 
views, and change. The research aims to contribute to the broader debate on 
military transformation by adding a novel dimension of analysis and providing 
new insights on the micro-level aspects of learning. 
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What do military officers think about the evolution of the global security environment 
and military transformation? The debate on force transformation has been very lively 
in both military and academic circles in the past decade or so (Grissom 2006, Farrell, 
Rynning and Terriff 2013), partly due to the range and extent of military missions 
undertaken after the end of the Cold War, and in particular after 9/11 (Vennesson et 
al. 2009, Russel 2010, Foley et al. 2011, Catignani 2012, Haaland 2016). At the same 
time, a growing attention has been devoted by the literature to the military 
transformation in European countries, which should face an evolving scenario, from 
terrorist attacks to the military operations against the so-called Islamic State in Iraq 
and Syria (Meijer & Weiss, forthcoming). Yet, with a few important exceptions (Avant 
and Lebovic 2000, Caforio 2013; Mahnken and FitzSimonds 2003, Farrell 2008, Ruffa 
2014), the analysis of what the armed forces themselves think about transformation 
has been largely absent. While studies based on the analysis of doctrine and strategic 
documents exist and constitute a significant first level of analysis, military 
perceptions of transformations and its drivers have rarely been studied by asking 
military officers. And yet, the extent of change occurred in particular within European 
armed forces in the last decades can’t be fully described without taking into account 
the opinions of those most directly involved in the process of change.  
The contribution of this article to the mentioned gap is twofold. First, the 
paper presents original information on officers of the Italian Air force (ITAF) and 
provides a detailed analysis of their security perceptions and views of how armed 
forces are evolving. This also allows a fresh perspective on the evolution of Italian 
defence to be presented, which is per se a rather neglected issue within the literature 
(Caforio 2000; Ruffa 2014, Coticchia and Moro 2015). Second, through multivariate 
analysis, the article attempts to explain the perceived drivers of a crucial dimension 
of military transformation: jointness. The analysis links the military views about 
jointness with officers’ perceptions of the role of technology, previous deployment 
experience, and the threat environment. Although it is difficult to identify causal 
mechanisms, and we should always be careful to interpret survey data because of 
sample and other biases,  the results clearly show that officers’ views of technology 
have a significant impact on their views about military transformation. This work 
relies on a bottom-up approach that focuses on individual-level analysis through 
surveys, a method that is increasingly diffused in military studies (Soeters et al. 2014). 
Although the present research maximized internal validity at the expenses of 
external one, it also provides an original  “pilot study” that can be then adapted and 
replicated for other services and other countries, thus expanding knowledge of 
military officers’ perceptions and, their drivers. In sum, the added value of the paper 
to the current debate is related to the insights provided by the first comprehensive 
assessment of the Italian armed forces’ perceptions on military transformation, 
building on previous studies (Mahnken and FitzSimonds 2003, Farrell 2008) and 
proposing a way ahead to begin exploring significant correlations. 
The article proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief and updated 
literature review on military transformation and innovation, focusing in particular on 
NATO countries. The article then presents military transformation in the context of 
Italian Armed Forces. Hypotheses, data, and methods are reported in the following 
section. Then, the empirical section illustrates the main results of the survey through 
descriptive statistics and regression analyses. The last section summarizes the 
preliminary findings, and discusses avenues for further research. 
Force transformation in comparative perspective 
Military innovation studies represent “a natural port of call” (Norheim-Martisen 2016, 
p. 318) for investigating how military organizations change and transform.1 Military 
innovation is defined as “change that forces one of the primary combat arms of a 
service to change its concepts of operation and its relation to other combat arms, 
and to abandon or downgrade traditional missions” (Rosen 1988, p. 134). “Military 
innovation is a dynamic process precisely because it involves the interplay of 
international drivers and national shaping factors” (Farrell 2008, 783).  
Recent scholarship2 has emphasized the relevance of bottom-up approaches, deeply 
criticizing the literature on military innovation because of the excessive attention 
devoted to the top-down processes. As remarked by Farrell (2008, 806), “bottom-up 
learning from operational experience” has been insufficiently recognized in the 
literature. For instance, Grissom (2006) has highlighted the need to better investigate 
the mechanisms of learning and adaptation and the cases where bottom-up drives 
have effectively led to innovation. The existing debate in the literature is still lively. 
Grissom’s study, focusing on bottom-up innovation, contributed to increase the 
significance of strategic culture and the peculiarities of institutional learning in 
military organizations. Griffin (2016) states that since the Grissom article, 
organizational and strategic culture has dominated the field of military innovation, 
fostering a sort of “cultural turn” in the field.3 The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan also 
contributed to a change of focus in the literature, often described exactly as a “shift 
                                               
1 The concept of ‘force transformation’ has emerged more recently as an attempt to describe 
the changes that armed forces should undergo in response to technological change 
(Farrell et al. 2013). 
2 For a comprehensive review of military innovation studies, which goes beyond the purpose 
of this article, see Norheim-Martisen (2016), Griffin (2016), and Grissom (2006). 
3 Griffin (2016) criticizes such a cultural turn on the grounds of “theoretical conservatism” 
because culture has been rarely considered an independent driver of transformation. 
from top-down to bottom-up adaptation or innovation” (Haaland 2016, p. 3). In fact, 
bottom-up approaches have emphasized identification of how military forces 
adapted and innovated in response to developments in those conflicts (Russell 2010, 
King 2010, Foley et al. 2011).  
Different views emerged regarding operations performance, learning and 
adaptation (Farrell 2010, Terriff et al. 2010, Catignani 2012). For instance, diverse 
findings have been reported concerning emulation from NATO: Terriff (2010) 
explores challenges and opportunities “NATO Transformation” poses for France 
after Paris re-joined the alliance's integrated military structure, while Farrell (2008, p. 
803) and Farrell and Rynning (2013) highlight the limited impact of NATO’s 
transformation agenda on transformation at national level (for France and the UK). 
Coticchia and Moro (2016) reveal different results in the case of Italy because NATO 
has played a very significant role, both as preferred source of doctrinal innovation 
and as broad framework of emulation and ‘learning by doing together’. 4  Also, 
Pannier and Schmitt (2014) illustrate the institutionalized cooperation and the 
emulation occurred in France, Germany and the UK due to the influence of NATO. 
Hardt (2017) focuses on the origins of institutional memory, investigating the role 
played by NATO elites.  
The attention devoted to the institutionalization of lessons learnt increased in 
the literature. However, “although these studies also touch upon the complexity of 
the learning process, they do not discuss in detail how experiences, learning, and 
adaptation are connected – or not” (Haaland 2016, p. 4). This study aims at providing 
a contribution to the current debate, investigating the perceived effects of force 
transformation5. On the whole, a growing interest in survey of armed forces involved 
in military operations has emerged (Mahnken 2013). However, despite officer 
attitudes “may play an important role in the process of innovation, to date they have 
received little scrutiny” (Mahnken and FitzSimonds 2004, 59). As reported by Avant 
and Lebovic (2000), it is worth investigating the attitudes of armed forces concerning 
the post-Cold War missions in order to assess how they really support (or not) the 
operations undertaken after the end of the bipolar era.6  
                                               
4 For instance, Caforio (2013) has stressed role played by NATO in shaping comprehensive 
and counter-insurgency approaches during the operation ISAF in Afghanistan. 
5 For a review of theories on military attitudes see, among others: Avant and Lebovic (2000).   
6 Also for this reason, other scholars focused specifically on the role played by learning and 
military education. According to Griffin, military education can be “incredibly revealing” 
(Griffin 2016, p. 17) about learning cultures of militaries because it can highlight crucial 
features, but we “still don’t have empirical studies on bottom-up learning in peace”. 
Existing empirical analyses on military education are generally focused on the curriculum 
content (Foot 2002), the main outputs of the courses (Kennedy and Nielson 2002), the 
In line with this view, this paper adopts a micro-level perspective through a 
survey that portrays views and perceptions of ITAF. Following Norheim-Martisen 
(2016), we believe that the current debate misses the micro-level perspective, which 
helps in understanding transformation as something far from being uniform. In other 
words, we should unpack the “conventional story” of the post-Cold War European 
military transformation (Luttwak 1996), when armed forces “have moved from 
standing armies designed to defend the European mainland from Soviet invasion, to 
a smaller, but qualitatively better, force geared towards out-of-area operations”7 
(Norheim-Martisen 2016, p. 316). Therefore, the manuscript investigates the 
underrated case of the ITAF to provide a “pilot study” on military views, focusing on 
one of the most militarily engaged European services in operations abroad after the 
end of the Cold war (Ignazi et al. 2012). 
 
Military transformation. The Italian case 
Despite the significant contribution provided by Italian troops in several post-Cold 
War military operations, the overall interest on Italian armed forces has been limited. 
Only in recent years the literature has started to examine the Italian military 
transformation in comparative perspective (Coticchia and Moro 2015, 2016), the role 
played by Italian military and strategic culture (Ignazi et al. 2012, Ruffa 2014), the 
evolution of the whole national defence sector (Giacomello and Verbeek 2011), the 
relationship between Italian public opinion and post-Cold War military interventions 
(Battistelli et al. 2012). 
However, as already stated, the perceptions of Italian officers regarding the 
Italian military transformation have been rarely, if ever, assessed8. Almost any 
comprehensive surveys on Italian military officers’ views regarding security issues 
and military transformation have been conducted in the post-Cold War era. 
Moreover, the (limited) analyses on Italian military missions have mainly focused on 
the operation on the ground carried out by the army (Ruffa 2014; Coticchia and Moro 
2014), devoting limited attention to the other services. Therefore, the findings of this 
pilot-study could represent a base for further cross-time analyses on Italian armed 
forces.  
The analysis of Italian official documents helps in revealing the crucial 
elements that need to be investigated in details in order to grasp the complex 
                                               
group interactions, the educational environment. For a comprehensive and updated 
review on “professional military education” see Paget (2016). 
7 For instance, all European states abandoned conscription, downsize their armies, investing 
in new technology. See Meijer & Weiss (forthcoming). 
8 For an exception see Caforio (2000).  
evolution of Italian post-Cold War defense. First, in a complex strategic scenario, after 
decades of military deployment, it would be crucial to better understand the officers’ 
views on the main perceived threats to national security. The post-Cold War official 
documents have constantly stressed the multidimensional nature of the challenges 
Italy should address. The “New Defence Model” (1991) perceived the deployment of 
troops abroad as fundamental to deal with regional and global instability9. The Libro 
Bianco 2002 (2002 White Paper)10 focused on the rise of asymmetric threats, such as 
transnational terrorism. Finally, the recent 2015 White Paper11 provided (for the first 
time) a detailed list of threats, from demographic changes to scarcity of natural 
resources and state fragility. Thus, it would be important to examine the (potential) 
process of “translation” from official documents to officers’ view concerning new 
threats and challenges in a transformed strategic context. ITAF, which have almost 
always been involved in regional and international crises, from “Desert Storm” (1991) 
to Libya (2011) and Iraq (2014-), represents an excellent case for analysis12.  
Second, a micro-level approach would allow investigating - from a different 
angle - the perceived level of adequateness of Italian equipment. The literature has 
recently pointed out the role of technological innovation in Italian defense, stressing 
the growing digitalization of forces.13 Also official documents, such as the Chief of the 
Italian Defence Staff Strategic Concept (2005)14 or Investire in Sicurezza (Investing in 
Security, 2005)15, have clearly conceived the technological advantage over the 
adversary as a force multiplier and a vital factor in missions abroad. More recently, 
the Network Centric Warfare (NCW) emerged at the center of national strategic 
debates (and concern)16. Because of its nature, Air Force is the most technological 
                                               
9 Ministero della Difesa, Modello di difesa. Lineamenti di sviluppo delle FF.AA. negli anni '90 
(Roma: Stato Maggiore della Difesa, 1991). 
10 Ministero della Difesa, Libro Bianco della Difesa (Roma: Stato Maggiore della Difesa, 2002). 
11 Ministero della Difesa, Libro Bianco della Difesa e della Sicurezza (Roma: Stato Maggiore della 
Difesa, 2015). 
12 It is worth noticing how ITAF played a primary role in some of the most relevant post-Cold 
War Italian operations, such as “Desert Storm” (Iraq, 1991), “Allied Force” (Kosovo, 1999), 
and “Unified Protector” (Libya, 2011).  
13 See, among others, Nones and Marrone (2011). 
14 Ministero della Difesa, Concetto Strategico del Capo di Stato Maggiore (Roma: Stato 
Maggiore della Difesa, 2005). 
15 Ministero della Difesa, Investire in Sicurezza (Roma: Stato Maggiore della Difesa, 2005). 
16 See, for instance, Ministero della Difesa, La Trasformazione Net-Centrica. Il Futuro 
dell’Interoperabilità Multinazionale e Interdisciplinare (Roma: Stato Maggiore della Difesa, 
2005 
advanced service in Italy and – therefore - officers’ views would allow assessing a 
possible “technological skepticism” before generalizing to the other services. 
Third, despite the considerable transformation of post-Cold War Italian 
defense, as well as the constant national involvement in a wide range of missions 
abroad, the “institutionalization” of lessons learned represents a relatively recent 
step for Italy, which just created new structures and institutions specifically devoted 
to that17. As recently highlighted by the literature (Hardt 2017), it is worth 
investigating what factors affect the sharing of knowledge and the institutional 
memory. For this reasons, the perceived factors that influence forces’ process of 
learning and adaptation should be carefully examined, especially after years of tough 
operations in Afghanistan and in Middle East.  
Furthermore, studies on Italy (Battisti 2012, Ignazi et al. 2012, Coticchia and 
Moro 2015) emphasised the centrality in official documents (and military operations 
undertaken abroad) of the notions of jointness and multinational interoperability. 
Although military innovation studies have a rich history, they have “largely 
neglected to examine jointness” (Mukherjee 2016, p. 6).18 The concept of jointness, 
as “the effective integration of the different service branches of a nation’s armed 
forces” (Paget 2016, p. 44), has become ever more important in the contemporary 
security environment. The “need for and importance of interoperability between and 
among services, at joint force level, has increased steadily” (Woodall 2000, p. 310). 
Nevertheless, there is still “no commonly accepted definition for jointness” 
(Mukherjee 2016, p. 4). Thus, a brief clarification is required before examining 
jointness and interoperability19.  
The literature on interoperability has historically focused on equipment, 
technology (Woodall 200), and – to a lesser extent – on human elements (Paget 
2016). According to Hura et al. (2000, p. 4) “interoperability is a measure of the 
degree to which various organizations or individuals are able to operate together to 
achieve a common goal”. In “military terms”, interoperability could be defined as 
“the ability for the systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services 
from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable 
them to operate effectively together” (Woodall 2000, p. 310). On the other hand, 
jointness is generally labelled as “the ability of the Army, the Air Force and the Navy, 
to plan and operate in a mutually reinforcing manner” (Mukherjee 2016, p 1). In sum, 
the conceptual boundaries between the two terms are still blurred. Some authors 
                                               
17 For a detailed analysis of the new institutions see Coticchia and Moro (2015). 
18 A recent exception is Zapfe (2016).  
19 For a broader analysis on interstate cooperation in defense see Pannier (2013).  
even refer to “joint interoperability”.20 For instance, Woodall conceives 
interoperability as the “glue” that holds together the so-called “joint systems” 
(which are defined as the systems that are designed to be employed by two or more 
of military services) in joint operations (Woodall 2000, p. 310).   
Bearing in mind this debate, this paper conceives “jointness” as a synonym of 
the Italian “interforzizzazione”, which means national inter-services cooperation and 
integration. With “multinational interoperability” we define “combined” 
cooperation and integration among allies (which obviously can undertake also joint 
operations together). 
Zooming to the Italian case, the official documents (for a review Locatelli et 
al. 2016) constantly emphasize jointness and multinational interoperability with allies 
as primary features of Italian Defence. The Italian White Paper (1985) introduced the 
concept of “joint operations”. But only the “New Defence Model (1991) started to 
consider a joint approach as vital to support the evolution of the military instrument. 
In that sense, several reforms were enacted from the 1990s. Law 25/1997 reformed 
the Chiefs of Staff (Stato Maggiore della Difesa) in order to enhance cooperation 
among forces and remove the separation that had constantly affected the navy, army 
and air force. Moreover, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff increased his power, 
altering his previous status of a primus inter pares.21 The White Paper (2002) reviewed 
all these main reforms, stressing the need to develop joint integration and combined 
interoperability and interdisciplinary action (also among services and ministries). 
“Investire in Sicurezza” (Investing in Security), released in 2005, devoted specific 
attention to the creation of air, land, maritime and joint expeditionary task forces, 
such as the Joint Surveillance and Command System – JSCS (a joint network-centric 
system). 
At the same time, military operations abroad also highlight a growing degree 
of jointness among the Italian armed forces at tactical and strategic levels (Ignazi et 
al. 2012). This requirement – already considered a precondition for commitment by 
the national and international doctrines – deeply affected Italian military 
engagement, improving joint capabilities especially regarding command and control. 
Finally, from an institutional perspective, the Centro Innovazione Difesa (CID, Centre 
for Defence Innovation) was created in 2009 within the Stato Maggiore della Difesa 
(III Reparto) to develop and update doctrine at the joint level. The Comando Operativo 
                                               
20 For instance: Woodwall (2000, p. 310). See Woodwall also regarding the main obstacles to 
“joint interoperability”. 
21 However, several crucial aspects, such as personnel management, still remained in the 
hands of each service. The most recent White Paper aims specifically at addressing such 
problems. See Locatelli et al. (2016).  
di Vertice Interforze (COI – Joint Operational Command), which was created in 1997, 
constitutes the framework in which operations have been managed. 
Therefore, the interforzizzazione became a vital requirement for Italian 
defence, as well as a crucial feature of the armed forces. Also multinational 
interoperability, especially through joint operations on the ground represents an 
indispensable element to understand the whole transformation of the Italian military 
(Coticchia and Moro 2015). The operations in Afghanistan and Libya, for instance, 
reveal the importance of the multilateral context for Italian forces, from the political 
and military point of view. Military interventions imparted the main impetus for 
enhancement of multinational interoperability through shared military actions (also 
intense combat missions like those in Afghanistan), constant information sharing, 
and mutual procedures. Also in regard to the acquisition of new military assets, as 
well the overall shape of the force structure, the multinational dimension is of crucial 
importance. In sum, jointness and multinational interoperability represent the 
cornerstones of the Italian doctrine and military deployment and procurement in the 
post-Cold War era.  
On the whole, the literature has widely recognized how jointness tends to be one of 
the most important aspects of the current wave of military of transformation, and 
has been variously associated with increased military effectiveness (Millet et al. 1986, 
Grissom 2008).22 While it is not easy to find a common ground in the debate on 
military innovation, there is a quite widespread agreement that jointness represents 
a particularly relevant dimension of transformation (Farrell et al. 2013). Several 
European countries have undergone institutional reforms to promote 
transformation “around the principles of jointness and interoperability” (Dyson 2011, 
p. 246). The advances of interoperability and synergy between services are 
“universally embraced” (Mukherjee 2016, p. 6)23. Therefore, in line with the current 
literature (Grissom 2008, Farrell et al. 2013, Mukherjee 2016), we can consider 
jointness and multinational interoperability as proxies for force transformation. As 
showed by Mukherjee (2016, p. 7), jointness is generally conceived as something that 
“tends to enhance military effectiveness”. The literature (Asch and Hosek 2004, p. 
34) has illustrated how (technical and cultural) change is inherently connected with 
jointness. Al already stated, in the post-Cold War era, interoperability was widely 
considered as a crucial premise to properly manage also new joint technological 
systems (Woodall 2000). In other words, “jointness routinely requires disruptive 
innovation” (Dombrowski et al 2002, p.128). Thus, we can use perceptions of 
jointness as a measure of how officers consider drivers of transformation.  
                                               
22 For a critique, see, among others: Owens (1997). 
23 For a different perspective (e.g., on how jointness could also inhibit military innovation) see 
Feaver (2003) and Gholz and Sapolsky (2000).  
However, jointness has been rarely studied as an “instance of military 
innovation”, maybe because it is a relatively recent phenomenon (Grissom 2008, 
Mukherjee 2016). Moreover, as already noted, the literature lacks of a comprehensive 
picture of the security perceptions expressed by Italian officers also regarding the 
other above-mentioned key-elements that have shaped Italian (and European) 
military transformation according to the current research24. 
 
Expectations and hypotheses 
In the first part of the empirical section the paper investigates the perceptions 
revealed by ITAF officers concerning the existing threats to national security, the 
level of adequateness of Italian armed forces’ technological progress, the role played 
by deployment and military technology in fostering innovation and change, and the 
impact of jointness and multinational interoperability in the evolution of Italian 
defence. The lesson-learning process is another subject of analysis. Consistently with 
suggestions from recent research (Catignani 2012; Ucko 2008), we focus on how 
military officers have interiorized the lessons of more than a decade of continuous 
operational experience. In sum, the first goal is to illustrate – from a micro-level 
perspective – the “military lenses” through which Italian officers perceive military 
transformation. 
The second aim of the paper is to explain the perceived drivers of jointness, 
which represents a crucial dimension of Italian military transformation.  
While current analyses25 tend to focus on civil-military relations as the primary 
explanatory variable for jointness, this paper specifically examines soldiers’ 
perceptions on the main drivers that have fostered jointness in the Italian case. We 
do not expect a causal relation between jointness and selected variables. Rather, the 
goal is to trace correlations between perceptions of the importance of jointness and 
perceptions of the importance of three potential drivers of “interforzizzazione”: 
technology, threats, and deployment. The rationale behind such selection is the 
following.  
First, we would expect that involvement in military operations would be 
positively related to the importance of jointness. Deployment has been generally 
considered as the main driver of Italian military transformation. According to Ruffa, 
who has specifically examined the ways through which Italian soldiers perceived the 
operation UNIFIL in Lebanon, the increasing number of military operations abroad 
                                               
24 For a review see: Farrell, Rynning and Teriff (2013). For the case of Italy: Coticchia and Moro 
(2015). 
25 See, for instance: Mukherjee (2016). 
(above all “peacekeeping missions”) represents “the main signal” (Ruffa 2014, p. 213) 
of post-Cold War Italian military change. In addition, according to the former Chief of 
Staff of the Italian Army, Lieutenant-General Claudio Graziano (2013, p.10), the 
operational dimension is the “centre of gravity of transformation”. As illustrated by 
official documents and lessons learnt collected across the last 25 years, an 
“expeditionary approach” requires expensive rapid and joint interventions at long 
distances. Therefore, in order to be effective, the Italian forces should integrate their 
capabilities, skills and knowledge. Analysis of past Italian operations (Ignazi et al. 
2012, Coticchia and Moro 2015) reveals the crucial role played by jointness in 
contributing to positively reach the end state of the missions. Thus, we expect that 
officers who have participated in military interventions abroad strongly perceive the 
relevance of jointness.  
Second, we would expect that the perception of the importance of military 
technology and the process of jointness would be positively correlated. In fact, 
military transformation is often grounded in the need to exploit new military 
technology (Hobson 2012). The debate on the RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs), 
starting in the Nineties, focused in particular on the impact of ICT and robotics of 
recent decades (Farrell 2008). The introduction of drones has been also heralded as 
having large transformational effects on war (Horowitz 2010). As in the case of US 
and UK doctrine (for a review, see respectively Mahnken and FitzSimonds 2003, 
Farrell 2008) Italian doctrine has constantly focused on the growing need for 
digitalization (Italian White Papers 2002, 2016). Military technology, which has been 
at the core of the reconfiguration of Italian forces, could be perceived as a driver for 
rising jointness. Indeed, a technological edge is widely viewed as crucial for 
contemporary armed forces, which are required to be integrated in order to exploit 
the technological advantages provided by new assets and systems (Farrell et al. 
2013). For instance, integrated systems of command and control are fundamental 
assets for troops. The role of such brand-new equipment, especially with NEC, has 
significantly increased (Nones and Marrone 2011). 
Third, one would also expect that the perception of the saliency of 
international threats would be related to the consideration on the importance of the 
process of jointness. In others words, the need to adequately address complex 
challenges would require a proper structure (Woodall 2000) and approaches. In fact, 
the Western armed forces that emerged from the Cold War had to face radical 
change in the strategic context, primarily in the threats that they had been designed 
to face (Freedman 2006). Therefore, and in line with previous research (Avant and 
Lebovic 2000) a growing perceived importance of complex and multidimensional 
global threats to international security (Buzan and Hansen 2009) could be positively 
related to a relevant consideration attributed to integrated efforts and approaches 
to address them. 
In sum, according to the above-mentioned drivers, three correlated 
hypotheses can be formulated: 
H1: Participation in military operations abroad positively influences the 
perception of the importance of jointness; 
H2: The perception of the importance of military technology (in contemporary 
and future warfare) and the process of jointness are positively correlated; 
H3: The perception of the saliency of multidimensional global threats is positively 
related to consideration of the importance of the process of jointness. 
Before testing these specific hypotheses (Section 6) the paper introduces 
data and methods (Section 4) and then it illustrates the overall picture on the 
perceptions expressed by Italian officers regarding the process of military 
transformation (Section 5). 
 
Data and methods  
The original data presented in this section was collected through a survey submitted 
to all Captains of ITAF attending the "Corso normale” and “Corso di perfezionamento” 
26 in the academic years 2014/2015 and 2015/2016.27 The total number of respondents 
is 286. Virtually all officers at the rank of Captain enter one of the two courses at some 
stage in their tenure, thus reducing sample selection biases.28 Since the seminal work 
by Stouffer et al. (1949), surveys have evolved and become increasingly diffused in 
the military sectors (Kraut 1996). Results of surveys serve to inform leaders and 
policymakers for a variety of purposes, such as obtaining accurate information 
regarding need and preferences, evaluating use and effectiveness of programs, and 
determining what and how to improve organizations (Edwards et al. 1997).  
                                               
26 The "Corso normale” is a semester-long set of classes destined to officers who entered the 
ranks of ITAF through the Air Force Accademia (getting their Bachelor’s Degree there), 
while “Corso di perfezionamento” is 12-week endeavour destined to officers who joined 
the services with high school or university degrees obtained elsewhere.  
27 As already mentioned, to assess the role played by technology we started by looking at the 
air force officers, given one would reasonably expect considerable importance to be 
attributed to technology by them. We made this choice in addition because the Italian air 
force, which has been rarely investigated by the literature in the post-Cold War era, has 
been affected by technological transformation “more than other services” (Locatelli 2014, 
p. 228). Thus, if the respondents do not attribute the expected relevance to technology, 
the role of this supposed driver of jointness could be reasonably excluded for all other 
services.    
28 See, for a use of exploratory survey with snowball sampling methods: Manhken and 
FitzSimonds (2013).  
According to Mahnken and FitzSimonds (2004, p. 58), there are at several 
reasons “why it is important to understand officer attitudes toward transformation”. 
Indeed, the officers are the ultimate practitioners of the new ways of warfare, they 
are recognized “experts” on military affairs, and they can promote (especially when 
they rise to senior positions) new innovative ideas for the service. In line with that, 
also Rosen (1991) in his seminal work has emphasized the relevance of senior officers 
in sustaining who supports change.  
In our case, the aim of the survey is to understand the process of 
transformation of the Italian armed forces that took place in the period 2001–2012. 
The survey examines, after a series of preliminary questions, the way in which the 
interaction between three basic dimensions (doctrine, budget, field operations) has 
influenced transformation of the forces, to understand the actual adaptability of 
forces, the mechanisms of learning and the level of consistency between the 
different dimensions. To maximize the prospective of knowledge accumulation, our 
survey heavily draws on similar research on military officers, designed by scholars 
such as Mahnken and FitzSimonds (2003) and Farrell (2008). The questions are 
intended to detect the perception of the changes occurred in the global security 
environment after the end of the Cold War and the response of the Italian armed 
forces from a bottom-up and micro-level perspective. The survey is composed of 26 
questions and divided into five separate sections.29 The empirical analysis below 
provides a brief illustration of each section and a series of descriptive statistics to 
show (at first glance) the composition of the sample and the military officers’ views 
on the main questions posed by the survey. 
 
The perceptions of Italian Air Force Officers: An overview 
First of all, in line with the survey designed by Mahnken and FitzSimonds (2003), we 
have gathered general information on age, gender, year of entry into service, 
academic degree and participation in international missions. The 286 ITAF members 
who took the survey have a mean age of 36.8 years and, considering their year of 
entry, have served in the army a mean of 17.1 years. Similar to Avant and Lebovic 
(2000), we believe that this age is particularly revealing of the prevailing attitudes 
within the organization because respondents “are senior enough to have 
internalized the mind-sets of their respective service branch, but not so senior that 
they might shed the constraints of the service perspective” (p. 40). The vast majority 
                                               
29 The five sections are: 1. General information; 2. The new international environment; 3. 
Technological change and armed forces; 4. Doctrinal evolution and learned lessons, and; 
5. Adaptation and organizational change. The authors provide additional information on 
the survey as well as on the dataset codebook upon request.  
of them (273) are male; only 13 are female;30192 have a university degree (either 
bachelor or masters) while 94 have a high school diploma, and 106 had some 
formative experience abroad during their studies in contrast to 180 who did not. 
Figure 1 shows the respondents’ record of missions abroad during their career. 
Figure 1 shows data in participation in international missions. As can be seen, 
the vast majority of respondents has participated in the Afghan mission (134), 
accounting for roughly than three times the other scenarios with the next-highest 
participation, Libya (45) and Kosovo (43). This category includes all the Afghanistan 
missions, both before 200531 and after. In other words, the similar context, nature of 
the mission, type of involvement, aims and tasks of these different missions allowed 
us to group them in a single category. Iraqi missions, on the other hand, were treated 
as separate categories due to their marked differences (traditional war against an 
official army vs. asymmetrical conflict against terrorist groups). On average, each 
respondent has participated in 1.15 missions; however, it has to be considered that a 
high number (101) of young air force members who took the survey had not yet been 
on any mission. If we calculate the mean value only for those who participated in at 
least one mission, the mean rises to 1.72. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the 
number of missions participated in; as can be seen the trend is clearly descending, 
with only 30 respondents having been to three or more international missions.  
                                               
30 Only one respondent did not answer to this question. 
31 In 2005 Italy took the command of the Western Area of ISAF, with increasing tasks. 
However, a substantial continuity marked the role played by the Air Force within 
multinational operation(s) in Afghanistan.  
 
 
In the survey, then, three separate questions are asked in order to understand 
the military view on the threats posed by the new international environment.  
There is, first of all, an almost unanimous consensus on the fact that the 
contemporary international environment poses greater threats to Italian national 
security in comparison to the Cold War era, in line with the mainstream theories of IR 
on the differences between bipolar and multi-polar power systems (For a review see 
Buzan and Hansen 2009). The vast majority of respondents, in fact, recognize that 
“the current international environment, in respect to that of the Cold War, poses 
greater threats to Italian national security” (229), while only a minority either 
disagrees (33) or has a neutral position (24). Also the most recent Italian strategic 
documents, such as the White Papers 2002 and 2015 adopt the same perspective 
regarding the growing challenges posed by the regional and international context 
(Locatelli et al. 2016).  
Secondly, as shown by Figures 3a and 3b, in line with the previous inquiry, the 
answers to one of the subsequent questions of the survey show a clear trend on what 
is perceived as today’s biggest threats to international security.  
Italian military doctrine has focused deeply on the main military and non-
military threats posed to international and national security, which are considered to 
be strongly interrelated. As already noted, and in line with NATO (2010) and EU (2003, 
2008, 2016), the multidimensional nature of challenges (terrorism, organize crime, 
“failing states”, regional insecurity, piracy, etc.) has been frequently highlighted by 
the Italian doctrine, especially in the post-2001 documents (“Nuove Forze per un 
Nuovo Secolo” 2001 and White Papers 2002 and 2015).  
Almost all officers, confirming what the literature on military attitudes has 
previously stressed (Avant and Lebovic 2000, 44),  chose “terrorism” as one of the 
answers; the other “top choices” were “cyber warfare and electronic attacks” and 
“international crises and instability”, which have regularly played a primary role in 
post-1990 Italian doctrine as a main justification for the active defence policy through 
military operations abroad.  
The least preferred answers are precisely those that refer to the typical Cold 
War global order threats, such as conventional attacks from other states, ballistic 
missiles and nuclear weapons proliferation.32 It is worth noticing the considerable 
figure related to cyber-attacks, in line with the increasing attention devoted by Italian 
defence to this issue.33 
 
In terms of respondents’ perception of threats in respect to Italian national 
(rather than international) security, the answers are consistent with the previous one 
                                               
32 For instance, the most recent Italian White Paper (2015) shares this perspective. 
33 See, for instance, the “National Strategic Framework for Cyberspace and Security”, 
Presidency of the Council of Ministers (2003), available at: 
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/national-cyber-security-strategies/ncss-
map/IT_NCSS.pdf 
concerning the perception of the main threat (terrorist groups). This proves that the 
Italian military – in line with the official post-bipolar doctrine – perceives its own 
country to be well integrated in the international arena, therefore facing the same 
major menace.  
Then, the survey aims at understanding how the military perceive the 
technological shift of armed forces in relation to different domains as well as the 
Italian armed forces’ adequateness in comparison to other NATO members and in 
terms of “jointness” and forces protection. The two items that capture the 
respondents’ view of technology, one of the crucial dimensions of our research 
question, can be found below. The first question focuses on the technological 
superiority of the state34, the second on “jointness” and interoperability of forces. 
 
Figure 4 reveals a shared “faith” in the technological edge. This finding 
confirms the results reported both in Mahnken and FitzSimonds (2003, 18) and in 
Farrell (2008, pp. 789-790), who revealed the perceived relevance between UK 
officers regarding the role of information and communication technology in military 
operations. One would expect that the asymmetric nature of contemporary conflicts, 
from Iraq to Libya and Afghanistan, as well as the spread of civil wars and wars 
“among the people” (Smith 2006) would affect a different perception regarding 
technology. As already noted, we should consider that air forces have played very 
specific tasks in current military operations, developing technological capabilities to 
be more effective in the above mentioned strategic scenarios (e.g., through 
precision-guided ammunition, etc.). Figure 4 also illustrates the perceived 
fundamental role of technology in ensuring jointness and interoperability. Another 
interesting aspect that is worth highlighting is the comparison of the perception of 
the adequateness of the different assets that compose the Italian armed forces: 
Naval, air force, ground and cyber assets. As Figure 5 shows, all “traditional” assets 
                                               
34 The survey substantially replay the question posed by Mahnken and FitzSimonds (2003, 18, 
Fig.1): “Military forces employing information-age technology, doctrine, and organizations 
will enjoy a substantial edge over those that do not”.  
show a similar trend, while cyber assets are the only ones with a trend skewed 
towards a negative perception. As stated above, cyber-threats are widely perceived 
as relevant threats, but only in relatively recent times the Italian defence has 
developed specific capabilities to address such challenge.35 
 
Respondents, considering the previous figures, appear to be “technological 
enthusiasts”, and at the same time they believe that cyber assets – the most 
technologically advanced of all – are indeed those that the Italian armed forces still 
need to improve. Also such finding is in line with the results reported by Mahnken 
and FitzSimonds (2003, p.41), who illustrated how the vast majority of their 
respondents (US offers) consider information systems and networks as “highly 
vulnerable”. 
The survey also investigates the military perception of doctrinal evolution and 
its drivers, as well as the main factors influencing the process of learning. An 
interesting element worth highlighting is, as shown by Figure 6, the clear perception 
of the main drivers of armed forces’ learning processes. 




Similar to previous questions, respondents were asked to pick the three most 
important factors. The first point worth noting is that the most relevant factors that 
foster learning as mentioned by respondents are all elements that concern 
deployment: participation in international missions (266, which means that only 7% of 
the sample did not pick this answer) and interaction with allies on the ground (159). 
By contrast, doctrinal development is not considered as important, with a striking 
difference however. NATO doctrinal development is believed to be a factor 
influencing learning process at least by slightly less than half of the respondents 
(128), but EU (6), ONU (9) and National (26) doctrinal development is dismissed as 
practically irrelevant.  
Those findings confirm the existing research on Italian military transformation 
(Ruffa 2014, Coticchia and Moro2015) that has emphasized the role of deployment as 
a driver of innovation as well as the wide process of emulation from NATO.  
The four questions of the fifth and final section of the survey are focused on 
the element of jointness (“interforzizzazione”), the process of mutual integration of 
the different services of the armed forces. The questions aim at identifying the main 
elements that the military consider crucial for the future of Italian armed forces in 
this regard. Questions 23, 24 and 25 in particular focus on how this process will impact 
on assets, doctrines and organizational structures of armed forces36. As shown by 
Figure 7, the perception of all three elements has a similar trend.  
                                               
36 Also in this case, the survey follows the design adopted by Mahnken and FitzSimonds 
(2003, 56), who investigated “new technology, operational concepts, and organizations”. 
 
 
Most respondents, in line with the findings reported by Mahnken and 
FitzSimonds (2003, p.76) on the US case, agree that the process of interforzizzazione 
will impact all three elements, particularly on organizational structures (225) more 
than assets (188) and doctrines (179). However, the trend is clear, with a few 
respondents disagreeing, a slightly higher number of respondents neither agreeing 
nor disagreeing, and the great majority of them agreeing.  
In the next section we investigate how a set of independent variables 
influences the perception of interforzizzazione. 
 
The drivers of transformation through officers’ opinions: a preliminary 
analysis 
The purpose of this section is to test empirically the hypotheses presented above. 
According to our theoretical framework, we expect that the consideration of the 
importance of the process of interforzizzazione as a driver of military change is 
influenced by three factors: a) previous deployment, b) perception of international 
threats and c) consideration of the technological element of military forces. First of 
all, as described in the previous section, the survey included three separated 
questions that captured the respondents’ perception of jointness as a driver for 
future change in: a) assets, b) doctrines and c) organizational structures. As seen 
above, the trend is clear: on overall, respondents think that jointness, in all three 
dimensions, will be a relevant driver for future change.37 A single dependent variable 
then has been constructed as the combination of the three above-mentioned 
                                               
37 As stated above, the survey is almost the first comprehensive assessment of Italian armed 
forces’ perceptions on security issues and military transformation. Thus, change is not 
assessed in comparison to former views and findings, but rather the paper aims at 
illustrating the perceived drivers of current and future transformation.  
questions.38   
Three separate models are tested employing different groups of independent 
variables that refer separately to our three hypotheses, as well as a fourth 
comprehensive model comprising all independent variables. 
The first group, testing H1, is composed of a series of dichotomous variables 
that captures the military’s participation to a series of international missions. 
Consistent with what was argued before, we expect that participation in missions 
where force integration was crucial to positively influence the perception of the 
importance of jointness. The variable “Deployment” is a dichotomous variable that 
captures if the respondent has ever participated in an international mission. We also 
test if participation in different missions has effects on the respondents’ perception 
of jointness. 
The variable that tests our second hypothesis, “tech”, corresponds to the 5-
scale agreement with the following statement: “Technological supremacy will always 
constitute an advantage for those states that can benefit from it”. Consistent with 
H2, we expect those who are more in agreement with this statement to be more 
prone to consider jointness as a driver for future change. Therefore, we expect this 
variable to be statistically significant and with a positive substantial effect on our 
dependent variable. 
Third, we look at how respondents’ perception of different threats affects 
their view on jointness. More specifically, we expect those who consider new, multi-
dimensional threats as the main menaces for international security to be also inclined 
to attribute more importance to jointness. Therefore, we expect variables that 
capture these aspects (such as cyber threats and terrorism) to be significant and 
positively correlated with our dependent variable. 
Two control variables are included in all models. The first is “Years_service”, 
measuring the number of years the respondent has been enrolled in ITAF. The second 
is “Education”, a dichotomous variable that scores 0 for those who possess a high 
school diploma and 1 for those who have obtained a higher education degree. The 
impact of these variables on the perception of jointness importance is tested through 
an OLS regression analysis. We also employ robust estimators to correct for standard 
errors. The results are shown in table 1. 
 
                                               
38  This variable, capturing the overall perception of the importance of “interforzizzazione”, 
is therefore a discrete variable that ranges from 3 (a respondent strongly disagreeing to 
all three questions: 1+1+1 = 3) to 15 (a respondent completely agreeing with all three 
statements: 5+5+5 = 15). The results obtained by employing separately the three variables 
do not differ substantially across models and remain particularly stable regarding the key 
finding. This confirms that using the aggregated variable is a parsimonious choice that 
does not conceal any meaningful variance. 
 
Deployment variables show interesting results. The dichotomous variable is 
not statistically significant, which means that there is no correlation between having 
mission experience at all and perception of jointness importance. This can be 
explained by considering that it is not mission experience in itself that impacts on 
jointness’ consideration, but rather the participation in specific missions where 
jointness was particularly relevant.39 In both model 1 and 4, in fact, the only 
                                               
39 It is worth observing that the current literature on post-Cold War Italian defence illustrates 
the relevance of jointness for all Italian military operations (for a review, Coticchia and 
Moro 2015). 
statistically significant deployment variable is Iraq 2003 (95% c.i.). Officers who have 
participated to this mission tend to attribute more importance to the overall 
perception of jointness as a crucial element for the future development of military 
transformation, however with a relatively small substantive effect. In fact, the 
independent effect of being an Iraq veteran corresponds to a 10.9% increase on the 
overall perception of jointness importance. Given that this scenario was peculiar in 
terms of ITAF’s participation to the mission (because of the limited jointness on the 
ground),40 this result needs to be further addressed in a subsequent stage of research 
that should take into account in detail the specificity of the different nature of this 
mission. Farrell (2008), focusing on the British Army, comes to a broader conclusion: 
“hard lessons learned in war can be a catalyst for major change” (p. 30). The limited 
scope of our survey sample does not permit a generalization of this result, however 
this analysis suggests that more than overall experience it is the type of experience 
(the mission undertaken) that influences the perception of jointness importance.  
Technology, instead, shows straightforward results. Consistent with the 
hypothesis presented, there is a strong correlation between the belief that 
technology constitutes a key element of armed forces superiority and the perception 
of the effects of jointness: variable “tech” is in both model 1 and 4 statistically 
significant at 99% confidence interval with a positive substantive effect. Those who 
consider technology an everlasting asset of warfare superiority, also tend to consider 
jointness a crucial element for the future development of armies. Officers completely 
agreeing with the statement on technological superiority, in respect to those 
completely disagreeing, show a 23.3% increase in the overall perception of jointness 
importance. Therefore, H2 is empirically corroborated, and constitutes the most solid 
result of our statistical analysis.  
As for threat-related variables, captured by H3, we find some results in line 
with our expectations (cyber) while others show rather surprising results (nuclear). 
Both variables are statistically relevant at a 95% confidence interval with considerable 
substantive effects. In other terms, no clear-cut distinction between Cold-war era and 
new threats emerge from this model, in contrast to what that the previous 
descriptive part of the research showed. 
Finally, the control variable “education” is not statistically significant in any 
model, while “years of service” is statistically significant at 95% c.i. and with very small 
substantive effects only in model 3 and 4, and 90% c.i. in model 1. In the 
comprehensive model, every additional year of service corresponds to a marginal 
0.4% increase in the perception of jointness importance. It seems that it is not the 
level of education that impacts on our dependent variable, but rather (yet with a 
small effect) the number of years spent in the armed forces. This is compatible with 
                                               
40 See: Ignazi et al. (2012). 
the findings of Mahnken and FitzSimonds (2003), who argue that within the US Army 
“the strongest base of support for transformation come from the senior ranks” (p. 
177). Finally, the relatively low level of the R2 of our comprehensive model (0.15) 
suggests that further analysis is needed in order to identify other potential elements 
that influence jointness perception. 
 
Conclusions 
Recent literature on military transformation highlighted the centrality of jointness as 
a key dimension of change. This study addressed the impact of jointness on military 
change through a novel approach based on a survey conducted among 286 military 
officers of the Italian air force. The objectives were twofold. First, we provided a 
detailed analysis of the security perceptions expressed by Italian Air Force officers. 
Descriptive statistics show that most military officers agree that the current 
international environment, in contrast to that of the Cold War, poses greater threats 
to Italian national security, that terrorism constitutes the key threat in the current 
international environment, and that change is needed in order to address this 
challenge. Second, we showed preliminary statistical evidence to explain the 
perceived drivers of a crucial dimension of Italian military transformation: jointness. 
In terms of previous deployment experience and perception of threats, our study 
shows results only partially consistent with our other hypotheses. For a theoretical 
perspective, it is worth noticing how the paper illustrated the limited changes 
occurred in service perceptions after deployment experiences. Multivariate analysis 
shows that the key element in driving the perception of jointness centrality is the 
belief in the importance of military technological superiority. Although we did not 
advance hypotheses on the specific causal mechanisms involved, this finding would 
be consistent with the idea that ITAF officers look at the drivers of change by 
choosing the “lenses” (technology) that would most favour the Air Force over other 
services. As it emerged from the survey conducted by Mahnjen and FitzSimonds 
(2003) “Air Force officers believed most strongly that new technology, operational 
concepts, and organizations will increase the importance of their branch relative to 
others in their service”.  
Clearly, the study is only exploratory, as it is conducted on a single service, and 
its external validity is inherently limited. Further research could then develop our 
preliminary findings through a comparative perspective, by examining other services 
and/or other states. For instance, as expected for air force officers, technology plays 
a relevant role as a perceived driver of jointness. Thus, a broader analysis on the navy 
or army could generalize such a result, which has been confirmed by our empirical 
section. In line with Ruffa, the paper contributed to illustrating how security studies 
“would greatly benefit from a dialogue with military sociology” (2014, p. 218). An 
interdisciplinary approach, which combines qualitative and quantitative methods, 
can pave the way to future research on military perceptions. More specifically, 
exploring other services and designing comparative cross-national research might 
enhance on the field. 
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